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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1221

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SUBJECT: UN FORCE IN CHAD: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

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¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a private meeting with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Minister of External Affairs of Chad Ahmad Allam-mi stressed the GOC was still in the "exploratory phase" of its deliberations on possible UN peacekeeping in eastern Chad and was open to discussion on the military component for an eventual force. However, he outlined the GOC vision of such a force as one with a humanitarian and protection mandate based not on UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006), but rather on the September 20 African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) Communique. He emphasized the GOC commitment to ongoing dialogue with the UN and the international community on the issue and supported the dispatching of a UN preparatory mission to Chad. Allam-mi feared a worsening of the humanitarian situation in eastern Chad if the crisis there were "internationalized" to the extent of appearing hostile to regional players. He reverted to the traditional GOC position of placing all blame for instability in eastern Chad on the persistence of the Darfur crisis and on Sudanese interference with Chadian rebels, showing little faith in attempts at reconciliation with Chad's eastern neighbor. Members seemed content with the prospect of continued dialogue with the GOC and called for the UN to re-engage. USUN recommends pushing the UN for the dispatching of elements of the advance mission authorized in the January 16 PRST to initiate movement on eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) In a private meeting with the UNSC, Minister of External Affairs of Chad Ahmad Allam-mi explained the GOC's (i.e., President Deby's) position on deployment of a UN force to Chad's eastern border region with Sudan. He prefaced his explanation by recalling the GOC's desire to re-locate all 12 refugee camps from the border but offered no elaboration on any GOC plan for this re-location when asked by Ambassador Sanders. Noting the complicated situation that exists in eastern Chad, including "murderous attacks" by the janjaweed which have resulted in the exodus of thousands of Chadians to Darfur, Allam-mi said the GOC had welcomed offers of assistance from the international community to protect refugees and humanitarian workers at risk in eastern Chad. Even Deby himself had agreed "in principle" to deployment of an international force for this purpose, Allami-mi went on, under the condition that it deploy with full respect for

Chadian sovereignty.

¶3. (SBU) Allam-mi then turned to a member of his delegation to outline the Chadian vision of such a force, a vision centered around police forces supported by gendarmes, both of whom should be under the auspices of an international police force for training and monitoring purposes. The mandate of this mission would be solely to protect refugees and humanitarians to reinforce security in, between and around refugee camps and to secure safe passage for humanitarian convoys. Only later in the course of Q & A with Members did Allam-mi specify that IDPs would also be included in this category, but he was clear that refugees, not/not IDPs, were the GOC's main protection concern. The total number of police and gendarmes proposed was 2,316: 120 in each of the 12 camps (1,440), 11 operators for each of 36 tanks at each of 12 camps (396), 20 civilian police for each of the 12 camps (240), 190 for convoy protection and 50 for headquarters. Air assets were envisioned for the force, according to Allam-mi. While he rejected both options for deployment presented in the February 23 SYG Report (repeating several times that deployment should be based not on OP9 of UNSCR 1706 but rather on the September 20 AU PSC Communiqué), Allam-mi said the GOC did not have a definitive position on the UN presence (adding that the Council of Ministers had yet to take a decision) and was open to discussion on its military component. Allam-mi agreed with Ambassador Sanders and Ghanaian Permanent Representative (PR) Effah-Apenteng that the UN force must be able to execute its mandate and to protect itself.

¶4. (SBU) Allam-mi emphasized the GOC commitment to ongoing dialogue with the UN and the international community on the issue and supported the dispatching of a UN "preparatory mission" to Chad (NOTE: It was unclear whether Allam-mi was referring to the advance mission MiNUTAC authorized in the

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January 16 UNSC Presidential Statement. END NOTE). He favored an eventual UN presence that would be of "modest" size so as to avoid creating an "internationalization" of the situation in eastern Chad that would provoke regional players, citing action that Libya had taken to try to calm the situation. Allam-mi feared that Sudan would see a robust force as an attempt to cross the border into Darfur and would accordingly retaliate, as it was already doing in violation of the Tripoli Accords by arming Chadian rebels and bombing sites in the northeastern region of Chad's border. Given these bombings, Allam-mi contended Sudan was incapable of adhering to the terms of the Tripoli Accords, which called for a joint Chad-Sudan border force. Allam-mi claimed the GOC was fighting the janjaweed along its eastern border, resulting in modest IDP returns. He offered the support of Chadian security forces to the eventual UN operation but was emphatic that the international presence play no part with Chad's internal rebellion.

¶5. (SBU) Members were content with the prospect of continued dialogue with the GOC. Congolese PR Ikouebe and Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng called for a "meeting of the minds" between the UN and the GOC to find an "imaginative" solution to securing the east. French PR de La Sabliere was concerned by the apparent disconnect between GOC and UN visions of eastern Chad peacekeeping and called for a meeting with the UN Secretariat to find a solution. He called for a new UN

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mission to the region to conduct technical discussions with Chadian authorities, a call seconded by the Chinese, UK and Russian delegates. To this end Ambassador Sanders, drawing from reftel points, urged the immediate dispatching of the advance mission authorized by the Council in its January 16 Presidential Statement.

¶6. (SBU) Several delegations called for respect for GOC sovereignty. The Chinese, Russian and Qatari representatives

insisted on GOC consent before any UN deployment in eastern Chad. The French PR said that no further action on deployment could be taken without GOC endorsement. The Qatari delegate stressed that the GOC bore primary responsibility for the protection of its civilians but did not rule out external assistance from neighboring states and the international community. Employing a traditional stall tactic, he raised the possibility of seeking Sudanese concurrence on the idea of a UN border force, an idea echoed by Russian Deputy PR Dolgov. Allam-mi acknowledged that provisions of the Tripoli Accords calling for such consultation had gone unimplemented, and he reiterated that the solution to eastern Chad's problems lay in solving those in Darfur.

¶7. (SBU) No next steps were explicitly outlined. The French Mission circulated a "discussion paper" in advance of Allam-mi's briefing, but no action was taken on it during or after the March 23 session. Based on Members' reactions, it was premature to begin deliberations on an eventual resolution - Allam-mi in fact thanked the UNSC for not having hastily tabled a resolution - until the UN returns to Chad to continue discussions with the GOC.

¶8. (SBU) Poloff and Miloff subsequently met with DPKO Police Division and Chad Operations Office to talk about next steps in the wake of Allam-mi's proposal. DPKO police planners are moving forward but are opposed to the idea of deploying any police into a hostile environment without military back-up. They mentioned that they had personnel ready to go for the advance mission authorized in the January 16 PRST (MiNUTAC), whenever that mission might deploy. Poloff asked what was preventing these officers from going to Chad to initiate such technical discussions, since the Council authorized this departure back in January and since the police component was the one thing to which the GOC did not object and which would be necessary regardless of what the military component would or would not ultimately look like. Poloff argued that sending out such a team (for which funding already existed) could be seen as a confidence-building measure to get the dialogue going with the GOC, which had indicated through Allam-mi it was open to dialogue on the peacekeeping plan presented, and to lay the groundwork for adding on further peacekeeping layers to the eventual force. DPKO Police replied only that dispatching police would appear to be acquiescing to GOC demands.

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¶9. (SBU) DPKO Chad Operations Officer said he was working on a draft letter from the SYG to President Deby that was intended to take Deby up on his offer of dialogue on details of UN peacekeeping in eastern Chad. He agreed with Poloff that a third Technical Assessment Team would not be necessary and that MiNUTAC should be used as the vehicle for dialogue with the GOC. DPKO was concerned that Allam-mi's plan considered IDPs as an afterthought and would make sure this issue would not be neglected in any UN conversations with the GOC.

¶10. (SBU) USUN recommends pushing the UN for the dispatching of elements of the advance mission authorized in the January 16 PRST to initiate movement on eventual deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad. UN police experts could discuss with GOC counterparts plans for policing refugee camps and humanitarian corridors that would serve Chadian interests by training local police. The planners would need to stress, however, that this benefit does not come for free and would require military back-up to ensure protection and sustainability.

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